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The Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Raich provides an opportunity to
reflect on the Rehnquist Court’s apparent run at establishing a judiciallyenforceable federalism. Two of the most visible symbols of this effort
were the decisions in United States v. Lopez and United States v.
Morrison, in which the Court twice struck down acts of Congress as
beyond the scope of its commerce power. Now, nearly ten years after
Lopez and five years after Morrison, Raich leaves many wondering
whether the Court provided an answer to John Nagle’s question whether
Lopez was destined to be a watershed or a “‘but see’ cite.” In this
Article, we offer our tentative, impressionistic answer(s) to the question
we pose in this title. In doing so, we move from the practical impact of
Raich (i.e., what does this mean for as-applied challenges to which lower
courts were becoming receptive?) to more abstract ones (e.g., does Raich
represent the third death of federalism, or was the Rehnquist Court’s
federalism project an illusion?).
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INTRODUCTION

Gonzales v. Raich, coming as it does at the end of both Justice O’Connor’s
and Chief Justice Rehnquist’s tenure on the Court, provides an opportunity to
reflect on the Rehnquist Court’s apparent run at establishing a judicially
enforceable federalism. We say “apparent,” because we wonder whether there
wasn’t less to this than met the eye.
Two of the most visible symbols of this effort were the decisions in United
States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison, in which the Court twice struck
down acts of Congress as beyond the scope of its commerce power. Now,
nearly ten years after Lopez and five years after Morrison, Raich leaves many
wondering whether the Court provided an answer to John Nagle’s question:
whether Lopez was destined to be a watershed or a “‘but see’ cite.”1
Below, we offer our impressionistic answers to the question we pose in the
title. In doing so, we move from the practical impact of Raich (i.e., what does
this mean for as-applied challenges to which lower courts were becoming
receptive?) to more abstract ones (e.g., does Raich represent the third death of
federalism, or was the Rehnquist Court’s federalism project an illusion?).
Needless to say, it will take time to definitively assess the impact of Raich, so
we offer the following takes fully aware of their tentative nature,
notwithstanding the stirring imagery of headless zombies in which it is
wrapped.2
II. TAKE ONE: THE END OF AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES

There was irony in the timing of Raich. Examining lower court decisions
after Lopez but before Morrison, then again in the years immediately after
Morrison, we criticized the lower courts for not taking the Court seriously,
even after Morrison appeared to confirm that Lopez was not a fluke.3 Recently,
however, lower courts seemed to be taking the hint, sustaining as-applied
challenges to several federal criminal statutes.
For example, in 2003 the Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction of a
woman for possession of child pornography.4 The woman, who had a host of
substance abuse and mental health problems, was in possession of photographs
showing her and her ten-year old daughter posed together “with their genital
areas exposed.”5 When photo shop employees developing the pictures notified
1
John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving
Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV. 174, 176 (1998) (asking whether Lopez represented “a dramatic shift
in Commerce Clause jurisprudence” or was “destined to be a ‘but see’ citation”).
2
See infra p. 118.
3
Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance: The New
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Courts, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1253
(2003); Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or
What if the Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came? 2000 WIS.
L. REV. 369 (2000).
4
United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2003).
5
Id. at 1115.
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authorities, McCoy was charged with and pled guilty to possession of child
pornography under the federal statute, based on the fact that the picture was
produced “using materials which have been mailed or . . . shipped or
transported” in interstate or foreign commerce.6
Applying the factors set out in Lopez and Morrison, Judge Stephen
Reinhardt set aside McCoy’s guilty plea. He noted that the mere possession
here was not “economic activity”; the relationship between the commercial
child pornography industry and McCoy’s conduct was “highly attenuated at
best”; there was little tying the activity to “a discrete set of cases that have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce”; and the legislative history did not
“support the conclusion that purely intrastate ‘home-grown’ possession has a
substantial connection to interstate trafficking in commercial child
pornography.”7
While paying homage to Judge Reinhardt’s “well-articulated opinion,”
Judge Stephen Trott refused to accept its conclusions.8 “Congress has declared
that an entire class of activities substantially affects interstate commerce,”
wrote Judge Trott.9 “That activity is child pornography.”10 Thus, “the factual
non-commercial nature of a single item of the commodity is immaterial.”11
Similarly, in United States v. Stewart,12 Judge Alex Kozinski, writing for
another panel of the Ninth Circuit, reversed the conviction of a man charged
with possession of machine guns, which he had manufactured himself.13 As in
McCoy, Kozinski followed Lopez and Morrison to the letter. He first concluded
that mere possession of a machine gun was not “economic” activity.14 Further,
Kozinski found “the effect of Stewart’s possession of homemade machineguns
[sic] on interstate commerce” to be attenuated.15 The statute had “no
jurisdictional element anchoring the prohibited activity to interstate
commerce,”16 and none of the findings accompanying the ban on machine gun
possession “speaks to the relationship between mere possession of firearms and
interstate commerce.”17 The findings, Judge Kozinski continued, “focus
6
Id. at 1116−17. Both the camera and the film used had either traveled in interstate or
foreign commerce. Id. at 1116.
7
Id. at 1129−30. See also United States v. Smith, 402 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Corp, 236 F.3d
325 (6th Cir. 2001), all of which also reversed convictions of defendants whose child
pornography convictions hinged on the fact that material used in the production had traveled
in interstate commerce.
8
United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1141 (Trott, C.J., dissenting).
9
Id. at 1141.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
348 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003).
13
Id. at 1134 (noting that the machine guns Stewart was charged with possessing “had
been machined and assembled by Stewart”).
14
Id. at 1137.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 1138.
17
Id. at 1139.
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primarily on the need for federal enforcement where firearms cross state and
international borders, and are thus difficult for individual states to regulate on
their own.”18
As in McCoy, not every member of the panel was convinced. Judge Jane
Restani, sitting by designation, dissented, writing that “[p]ossession of machine
guns, home manufactured or not, substantially interferes with Congress’s long
standing attempts to control the interstate movement of machine guns by
proscribing transfer and possession.”19 Since Congress had chosen to regulate
the demand for machine guns by eliminating the market for them, it could reach
local, noncommercial possession, such as Stewart’s.20
In light of Raich, Judges Trott and Restani proved to be the better
prophets.21 But Judges Reinhardt and Kozinski—far from embarking on some
wild frolic and detour—were merely taking the Court at its word and applying
the factors as the Court had articulated them. One may forgive them if they feel
somewhat ill-used by a Court that cannot make up its mind. Whatever the
effects of Raich on lower courts (a point to which we return below), one thing
is clear: the as-applied challenges to which lower courts had been warming are
likely over. In both Stewart and McCoy, the correct outcome after Raich seems
clear: if Congress can eliminate the interstate market in machine guns or child
pornography, any manifestations of that activity, no matter how local, or how
non-commercial, are within its reach (unless Congress chooses to exempt local
activities).
III. TAKE TWO: THE EMILY LITELLA COURT

“Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.”22 That was the
statement in Planned Parenthood v. Casey with which the Supreme Court
responded to critics of its abortion jurisprudence. Even if the Court’s
framework was flawed, its essential holding had to be preserved, lest people
lose confidence in the Court and see its decisions as subject to shifting political
winds.23
Yet in Raich the Supreme Court seems quite ready to abandon previous
lines of jurisprudence without much concern for how it will affect its
credibility. That’s unfortunate, because the Court’s backpedaling on the
Commerce Clause is likely to have dramatic and damaging consequences for
the Court’s authority with the audience that watches it most closely, the lower
federal courts.
18

Id.
Id. at 1143 (Restani, J., dissenting).
20
Id.
21
The Supreme Court, in fact, granted certiorari in Stewart and in Smith and vacated
the judgments in both. See United States v. Stewart, 125 S. Ct. 2899 (2005); United States v.
Smith, 125 S. Ct. 2938 (2005).
22
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844
(1992) (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.).
23
Id. at 867−68.
19
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On more than one high-profile subject this term, the Court has been
reminiscent of the elderly and hard-of-hearing Saturday Night Live character
Emily Litella, who would make attention-getting pronouncements and then,
after some confusion, retreat with the trademark phrase: “Never mind!” With
its step back from the property rights cases in Kelo,24 and its retreat on the
Commerce Clause in Raich, the Court invites people to take its future
departures from settled law less seriously, since they can now be forgiven for
wondering whether the Court might, at some future date, reverse itself and
exclaim “Never mind!”25
Among those people are the judges of the federal district courts and courts
of appeal.26 As we have noted in previous works,27 those courts seem less
responsive to Supreme Court guidance—except when it steers them in
directions that they, for institutional reasons, already want to go—than to their
own institutional concerns. The classic model of judicial hierarchy, in which
the Supreme Court announces general principles that are then faithfully applied
by the lower courts, no longer holds, if it ever did.28
In arriving at that conclusion, we examined the way in which lower courts
applied the decisions in United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison.
The initial installment of our project, published in the Wisconsin Law
Review in 2000, was subtitled “What if the Supreme Court Held a
Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?” There, we concluded that lower
courts seemed strangely slow to respond to the Lopez decision, but suggested
that Supreme Court clarification might improve matters.29
A couple of years later, we authored the next installment of our survey.
Unfortunately, we found that lower courts were, in fact, doing little to put
Lopez’s reasoning into effect. Examining the large number of lower-court cases
addressing Commerce Clause issues, we found ample evidence of a deskclearing mentality at work. We concluded:
But if ideology is not the source of lower court resistance—or, if any
sustained inquiry is likely to result in the old Scots verdict, “not
proven”—is there an explanation for lower courts’ behavior?
Research by other scholars suggests that the problem here, to
paraphrase former presidential candidate Michael Dukakis, is not
ideology, but rather competence. What we are seeing in lower courts’
Commerce Clause decisions may be only symptomatic of a larger
problem in the federal judiciary: that of courts responding to an
24

Kelo v. New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
As Mark Tushnet observed: “The alternative, which I suppose is getting increasingly
plausible, is that the Court doesn’t even have an attitude about federalism. What it has are,
well, results.” Posting of Mark Tushnet to SCOTUSblog, “Understanding” Gonzalez v.
Raich,
http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/2005/06/understanding_g.html
(Jun. 6, 2005, 14:05 EST).
26
See, e.g., Benjamin Wittes, Without Precedent, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept.
2005, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200509/wittes (last visited Sept. 4, 2005).
27
Denning & Reynolds, supra note 3; Reynolds & Denning, supra note 3.
28
Denning & Reynolds, supra note 3, at 1299−1310.
29
Reynolds & Denning, supra note 3, at 399−402.
25
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increasingly unmanageable caseload by resorting to corner-cutting,
resulting in an overall reduction in the quality of courts’ work
product.30
New law from the Supreme Court, especially new law that might create more
burdens for overworked judges, was getting short shrift. Nonetheless, there
were signs that the lower courts were beginning to take the Court’s Commerce
Clause jurisprudence seriously.31 It seems unlikely, however, that this will
continue post-Raich,32 and that raises some questions as to the Supreme Court’s
role in the future.
As a practical matter, of course, Supreme Court control over the lower
courts has been notional for some time. Lower court caseloads have been
exploding, while the Supreme Court is actually hearing fewer cases than it did
decades ago. But the Supreme Court’s power has always stemmed more from
example than from its ability to directly overturn lower courts. Yet the more
unclear and hesitant the Supreme Court seems, the less likely it is that lower
courts will follow its lead.
That poses rather serious problems for the justice system. The legitimacy
of lower courts’ rulings, after all, stems largely from the notion that they are
supervised by higher courts. In the absence of such supervision, decisions at the
court of appeals level, if they are both effectively unreviewable (or at least
unreviewed) and not really guided by principles from above, are simply ad hoc
judgments by those who happen to have gotten hold of the case. These
decisions are not much different from the decisions of faceless bureaucrats in
the Executive Branch, with the exception, perhaps, that those faceless
bureaucrats are under the authority of elected officials—the President and, to
some extent, Congress—and hence subject to more public scrutiny and
supervision than the courts.
A system of ad hoc decisions guided more by institutional expediency and
personal preference than by overarching principle may or may not be a bad
thing, but it is not a system of justice as we know it. Yet the Supreme Court’s
retreats this term, coupled with its self-imposed caseload reductions in recent
years, suggest that the Court is less concerned than it should be with its role in
overseeing the lower courts.
Though simple politics probably provide a great deal of explanation for the
phenomenon of increased acrimony over court of appeals nominations, it is
worth noting that the less supervision the Supreme Court affords lower courts,
the more significant Congressional oversight, and particularly Senate scrutiny
of lower court appointments, becomes. And although much of the increased
scrutiny given to court of appeals candidates can be explained by the presence
of well-heeled interest groups with money to spend, and a desire for attention in
the media, there may be more going on than that. When federal appellate
judges were seen as dutiful followers of Supreme Court precedent, it made
30

Denning & Reynolds, supra note 3, at 1303.
Id. at 1262−99 (examining recent cases); see also supra notes 3−18 and
accompanying text.
32
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
31
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sense to pay less attention to them and to focus on the Supreme Court. But with
the Supreme Court deciding fewer cases, and with the courts of appeal seen
(correctly) as far more independent, it is only natural for people to pay more
attention to their staffing.
Such scrutiny, however, is a poor substitute for traditional appellate
oversight. It is possible that turnover in the Supreme Court (the current Court,
like Emily Litella herself, can be fairly characterized as both old and hard-ofhearing, even by Supreme Court standards) will reinvigorate its institutional
role. The Court, especially if its membership becomes both younger and more
vigorous, could easily return to its earlier caseloads, which would allow it to
provide a greater degree of supervision, and perhaps encourage it to state its
own positions more clearly and firmly. To the extent, of course, that the Court’s
lack of clarity stems from simple disunity, new appointments will only make a
difference if they produce a court that is more closely aligned on important
issues than today’s court; it is impossible to say, at this point, whether that is
likely, nor is it clear that even a Supreme Court composed largely of Bush
appointees would necessarily treat federalism more seriously.
Still if, as Larry Solum has asserted, “a results-oriented, closely-divided
court poses grave dangers for the rule of law,”33 then any change in the
Supreme Court’s make-up that would make it less closely divided (or, ideally,
less result-oriented) would be an improvement over a situation in which
idiosyncratic vote-counting is the preferred method of predicting Supreme
Court decisions, as it certainly has been in recent years. This suggests that a
highly contested appointment process, in which nominees have strategic
reasons to either conceal their ideology, or to have no consistent legal position
in reality, is unfortunate for the rule of law, and likely to undermine the
position of the judiciary over time.
On the other hand, some may feel that a weaker Supreme Court—and, for
that matter, a weaker judiciary generally—is actually a good thing, giving
primacy to the political branches and hence undermining concerns about the
“countermajoritarian difficulty.”34 While judicial unpredictability and
inconsistency may be unfortunate, the result—a sort of judicial anarchy—may
be preferable to the judicial tyranny that some—such as Robert Bork—have
been proclaiming for years.
We, however, are inclined to disagree. The judiciary is supposed to be
about principle, not politics; at most, principle is supposed to be tempered by
politics, not the other way around. The current situation has produced a
33
Posting of Lawrence Solum to Legal Theory Blog, O’Connor’s Importance on the
Court, http://lsolum.blogspot.com/archives/2005_07_01_lsolum_archive.html#112022961
950969703 (July 1, 2005).
34
See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16−17 (1962) (outlining
the “counter-majoritarian difficulty” with judicial review stemming from its character as
lawmaking by unelected judges). See also ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:
THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 139, 146 (1989) (using the term “Madisonian
dilemma” to describe the same difficulty). For a lengthy discussion of this subject see Glenn
H. Reynolds, Sex, Lies and Jurisprudence: Robert Bork, Griswold, and the Philosophy of
Original Understanding, 24 GA. L. REV. 1045 (1989).
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politicized yet incoherent judiciary that is effective on neither level. Both of us
have suggested reforms to the confirmation process,35 and we suggest that the
Emily Litella court is further evidence that something needs to be done.
We are not prepared to go as far as Richard Davis, who has proposed that
Supreme Court justices be elected for a single 18-year term.36 (Indeed, if we
were to go to judicial elections, it might make more sense to elect court of
appeals judges, given their current role. Such a move, though, seems like
overkill.) Still, such proposals should serve as a warning that an Emily Litella
Court is unlikely to sustain the kind of public regard that the Supreme Court
has come to expect.
IV. TAKE THREE: THE SUPREME COURT TO CONGRESS: “GET BIG OR
GET OUT”37

In an article written right after Morrison, Professor Adrian Vermeule
challenged the assumption that judicially-enforced limits on the Commerce
Clause would promote decentralized policymaking.38 Vermeule suggested that,
on the contrary, “Commerce Clause review . . . will promote the centralization
of public policy at the national level by providing congressional coalitions with
ex ante incentives to legislate more broadly, and to create national programs
that are more comprehensive, than they would otherwise choose.”39 Vermeule
noted that Lopez and Morrison left untouched the “aggregation” principle of
Wickard v. Filburn, as well as the “national-regulatory scheme” exception
borrowed from Hodel v. Indiana.40 The latter, Vermeule argued, “may allow
Congress to regulate intrastate activities that are not themselves commercial or
economic, so long as the regulation is integral to the success of a larger valid
scheme of (interstate or commercial) regulation.”41 Permitting the aggregation
and regulation of certain activities essential to the furtherance of a national
regulatory scheme, Vermeule wrote, “allow[s] and encourage[s] Congress to
35

See Brannon P. Denning, Empirical Measurement of Judicial Performance:
Thoughts on Choi and Gulati’s Tournament of Judges, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. __
(forthcoming 2005); Brannon P. Denning, The “Blue Slip:” Enforcing the Norms of the
Judicial Confirmation Process, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 75 (2001); Brannon P.
Denning, Reforming the New Confirmation Process: From “Despise and Resent” with
“Advice and Consent,” 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2001); Glenn H. Reynolds, Taking Advice
Seriously: An Immodest Proposal for Reforming the Confirmation Process, 65 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1577 (1992).
36
RICHARD DAVIS, ELECTING JUSTICE: FIXING THE SUPREME COURT NOMINATION
PROCESS (2005).
37
Comment to farmers attributed to Earl Butz, Secretary of Agriculture during the
Nixon and Ford administrations. Barbara O’Brien, Animal Welfare Reform and the Magic
Bullet: The Use and Abuse of Subtherapeutic Doses of Antibiotics in Livestock, 67 U. COLO.
L. REV. 407, 440 (1992).
38
Adrian Vermeule, Does Commerce Clause Review Have Perverse Effects? 46 VILL.
L. REV. 1325 (2001).
39
Id. at 1325.
40
Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981).
41
Vermeule, supra note 38, at 1332.
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ensure the constitutionality of otherwise-suspect provisions by broadening their
scope, or by bundling them into a comprehensive scheme of national economic
regulation. The ex ante effect of the current rules, then, may just as easily
promote broader federal regulation—policy centralization—as retard it.”42
Professor Vermeule’s understanding of both aggregation and the nationalregulatory-scheme principles proved to mirror the Court’s in Raich. In her
dissent, Justice O’Connor complained that the holding of Raich—that if
Congress may eliminate the interstate traffic of X, it may reach all activities
included within that general class, regardless how local or how
noncommercial—essentially gutted Lopez and Morrison. “Today’s decision,”
she wrote, “allows Congress to regulate intrastate activity without check, as
long as there is some implication by legislative design that regulating intrastate
activity is essential (and the Court appears to equate ‘essential’ with
‘necessary’) to the interstate regulatory scheme.”43 If this is true, O’Connor
continued, “then Lopez stands for nothing more than a drafting guide,” because
Congress could merely have passed a larger regulatory scheme prohibiting the
transfer or possession of firearms anywhere, and regulated the possession near
a school zone as an incident to that larger scheme.44
It remains to be seen whether, in fact, Raich will influence Congress to
legislate more broadly in order to avoid constitutional difficulties.45 However,
we feel confident predicting that Raich’s elaboration of the national-regulatoryscheme principle will invite lower courts to characterize existing statutes that
had previously been thought vulnerable to Commerce Clause challenges as
parts of national regulatory schemes, and hold that Congress may reach all
local, noncommercial activity within the classes of activities covered by those
statutes.46
But if Lopez and Morrison contained seeds of their own undoing that
flowered so soon—little more than a decade later, in fact—that raises the
question whether the restraints on the commerce power (and perhaps the
federalism project generally) were more shadow than substance. We consider
this below.
V. TAKE FOUR: THE RETURN (?) OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER
CLAUSE

Raich did make explicit what had largely gone unsaid in cases involving
congressional power in general, and cases involving the commerce power in
particular: the degree to which much of what we take for granted in articulating
42

Id. at 1333.
Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2222−23 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
44
Id. at 2223.
45
Early evidence showed that Lopez and Morrison’s effect on Congress was barely
perceptible. See, e.g., Neal Devins, Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred on the
Court’s Anti-Congress Crusade, 51 DUKE L.J. 435 (2001).
46
For specific examples of “as applied” challenges sustained prior to Raich that would
likely come out differently after it, see supra notes 3−18 and accompanying text.
43
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the scope of Congress’s power depends not so much on the scope of the power
“to regulate commerce . . . among the several States,” but rather on those
implied powers that are “Necessary and Proper” to regulating commerce.47
However, members of the Raich Court differed as to (1) what, precisely, the
Necessary and Proper Clause required Congress to demonstrate when using it
in combination with the Commerce Clause to expand power, and (2) how
deferential the Court needed to be to those congressional demonstrations.48
In McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall noted that the
Necessary and Proper clause granted extensive, but not unlimited, powers to
Congress:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution,
and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that
end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of
the constitution, are constitutional.49
Marshall’s famous statement might seem to be a test. In deciding whether
a Congressional action under its necessary and proper powers is constitutional,
we might ask: Is the end legitimate? Is it within the scope of the Constitution?
Is it not prohibited? Is it consistent with (a) the letter, and (b) the spirit of the
Constitution? And only if all of these questions are answered “yes” would the
congressional action be upheld.
In fact, however, the test doesn’t do much work. Marshall himself, of
course, largely abandoned the question of “necessity,” and it has gotten little

47

See BORIS I. BITTKER, BITTKER ON THE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
COMMERCE § 5.01[B] (1999) (noting that “the Supreme Court has long interpreted the
Commerce Clause as a grant of power to Congress to regulate a state’s ‘internal commerce,’
sometimes labeled ‘intrastate commerce,’ if it has a sufficiently substantial effect on
‘commerce among the several states’” and that “[s]ometimes the Court has cited the
Necessary and Proper Clause . . . but usually the authority is treated as self evident”); see
also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 583−86 (1985) (O’Connor,
J., dissenting) (noting the connection between congressional authority of intrastate
commerce and the Necessary and Proper Clause); Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 234 U.S. 342 (1917) (upholding federal power to regulate local state freight rates;
federal authority “necessarily embraces the right to control [railroad] operations in all
matters having such a close and substantial relation to interstate traffic that the control is
essential or appropriate to the security of that traffic, to the efficiency of the interstate
service, and to the maintenance of conditions under which interstate commerce may be
conducted . . . ”); United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 72, 78 (1838) (upholding
power of Congress to punish theft of goods from ship-wrecked vessel on land completely
within a single state; invoking combination of the Commerce Clause with the Necessary and
Proper Clause).
48
BITTKER, supra note 47, at 5−11 to 5−12 (speculating that using the Necessary and
Proper Clause might “serve as a more effective barrier to a rampant Commerce Clause than
does the requirement that local activities must ‘affect’ or ‘substantially affect’ interstate
commerce if Congress wishes to regulate them” but doubting whether such a shift would “be
perceptibly more restrictive than the current case law” because “the courts might well
ordinarily defer to the judgment of Congress in determining whether a disputed legislative
measure is ‘necessary and proper for carrying into Execution’” congressional powers).
49
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).

LCB94_REYNOLDS_DENNING.DOC

2005]

WHAT HATH RAICH WROUGHT?

11/21/2005 1:04:44 PM

925

attention from courts since. By the time we reach Raich, however, the question
seems to have been condensed to this:
In assessing the scope of Congress’ authority under the Commerce
Clause, we stress that the task before us is a modest one. We need not
determine whether respondents’ activities, taken in the aggregate,
substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a
“rational basis” exists for so concluding.50
One wonders whether the ratifiers would have included the Necessary and
Proper Clause had they foreseen such a shift.
At any rate, though the majority opinion does not apply Marshall’s test to
the case before the Court, Justice Scalia, in his concurrence, announces that it is
easily satisfied, and Justice Thomas, in his dissent, concludes that it is not
satisfied at all. Neither are we, nor should be serious watchers of the Court.
There are two ways of looking at the Necessary and Proper Clause: as an
independent source of power for Congress, or as an adjunct—relating to
means—in serving the ends spelled out in Congress’s enumerated powers.
Marshall, in McCulloch, suggested that it was the latter, but interpreted things
so expansively that it has become, essentially, the former. As a practical matter,
the Court’s treatment of “necessary and proper” parallels its treatment of
“public use” in the takings context: “when the legislature has spoken, the public
interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive.”51
Yet this judicial abdication calls the entire notion of enumerated powers—
and, for that matter, the notion of judicial review—into question. If Congress is
to be the judge of its own powers, then there seems little point to an
enumeration. And if courts are, as a practical matter, going to defer to
Congress’s own interpretation of the scope of its powers, then their role is
likely to be limited.
As James Madison himself said about the Necessary and Proper Clause:
“Whatever meaning this clause may have, none can be admitted, that would
give an unlimited discretion to Congress.”52 Madison’s intention, however, has
not carried the day, nor has the intention of the Framers generally. As Randy
Barnett notes:
One thing we do know about its legislative history is the wording of a
clause that was earlier proposed by Gunning Bedford and rejected by
the Committee. The proposal was that Congress have the power “to
legislate in all cases for the general interests of the Union, and also in
those to which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the
harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of
individual Legislation.” In other words, the Convention had before it
an almost completely open-ended grant of power to Congress and

50

Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2208 (2005).
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). Seen in this light, the connection between
this term’s Raich and Kelo decisions should be obvious.
52
Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 183 (2003), quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1947 (Joseph Gales ed., 1791).
51
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rejected it, without discussion, in favor of the enumeration of
particular powers and the ancillary Necessary and Proper Clause.53
This is clearly not the view of a majority of today’s Supreme Court. For
those of us who believed that the Supreme Court was showing an increased
enthusiasm for enumerated powers doctrine, that is a disappointment, leavened
only by the fact that at least some justices have acknowledged the issue. But it
seems clear that, for the moment at least, judicial review of congressional
actions under the Necessary and Proper Clause is effectively nonexistent. That
is deeply unfortunate, and likely stems, at least in part, from the Court’s
unwillingness to be charged with “judicial activism.”
The power of judicial review, through which the Supreme Court may
invalidate laws that are beyond Congress’s power to enact, is a fundamental
part of our constitutional scheme; its proper exercise is not judicial “activism,”
but a judicial duty. When the Court strikes down laws that violate the
Constitution, it is merely doing what it is charged to do. By contrast, when the
Court invents new grounds for legislative power that are not within the
Constitution, it is, by its deference, actually practicing judicial activism.
As James Madison himself said about the provisions of the Bill of Rights,
“If they are incorporated into the constitution, independent tribunals of justice
will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights;
they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the
legislative or executive.”54 This bulwark, whether impenetrable or not, is
clearly narrow, as the Court seems unwilling to review “assumptions of power”
that do not pose a conflict with explicit constitutional restrictions.
These are hardly new questions, but Raich again demonstrated that they
can be fundamental ones. We hope that Raich, at least, will make litigants,
judges, scholars, and members of Congress focus on the Necessary and Proper
Clause and its relationship to Congress’s enumerated powers. With the demise
of the doctrine of enumerated powers as a restraint on federal power, the only
protection remaining for the liberties of citizens not sheltered by powerful
lobbying groups is that provided by the positive limitations on government
embodied in the Bill of Rights. Those provisions were inserted by pessimists
who did not believe—rightly, as it turns out—that the doctrine of enumerated
powers would be enough to restrain the federal government over the long term.
There is no reason to believe, however, that the Bill of Rights itself will survive
over the long term if the rest of the plan is abandoned. As National Aeronautics
and Space Administration engineers say, once you start relying on the backup
systems, you are already in trouble. But that is where we are today.

53
Id. at 185. See also Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of
Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267,
286−89 (1993).
54
JAMES MADISON, Amendments to the Constitution, in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 206−07 (Charles Hobson and Robert Rutland eds., 1979) (1789).
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VI. TAKE FIVE: IS RAICH THE “THIRD DEATH OF FEDERALISM?”55 OR
WAS LOPEZ MERELY “ZOMBIE FEDERALISM”?

Early on, Lopez appeared to signify that reinvigoration of a judiciallyenforced federalism was the principal project of what Professor Merrill has
coined the “second Rehnquist Court.”56 Chief Justice Rehnquist appeared to
make good on his prior expression of confidence that federalism “will . . . in
time again command the support of a majority of this Court.”57 The evidence
was certainly there: requiring Congress to make a “clear statement” was
designed to protect federalism interests,58 as was articulation of the “anticommandeering” principle. These were followed not only by Lopez, but also by
the expansion of sovereign immunity beginning with Seminole Tribe v.
Florida,59 by the limitation of congressional power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment,60 by extension of the anti-commandeering principle in
Printz v. United States,61 and, finally, by invoking the Commerce Clause for the
second time in five years to invalidate an Act of Congress.62 The combined
effect of these cases led one federal judge to complain that the Court was
“narrowing the nation’s power”; and that the Court had “side[d] with the states”
against federal power.63

55
Cf. William W. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 Mich. L. Rev.
1709 (1985).
56
Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary
Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569 (2003).
57
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 580 (1985) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist’s refusal to be reconciled to the (temporary) triumph of
the process federalism of the majority and promise to fight on always reminded us of
Malvolio’s promise to have his revenge at the end of Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night. See
Twelfth Night, act V, scene 1 (Malvolio promising that “I’ll be revenged on the whole pack
of you”).
58
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
59
517 U.S. 44 (1996); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that
nonconsenting states could not have sovereign immunity waived for suits brought in state
court). For an argument that there is much less to sovereign immunity than meets the eye,
see Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, Who’s So Afraid of the Eleventh Amendment? The
Limited Impact of the Court’s Sovereign Immunity Rulings, 105 COLUM. L. REV. __
(forthcoming 2005).
60
See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see also Bd. of Tr. of Univ.
of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. Fl. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000);
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
61
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
62
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
63
JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION’S POWER: THE SUPREME COURT
SIDES WITH THE STATES (2002). For critical reviews, see David P. Currie, Inflating the
Nation’s Power, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1229 (2004) (book review); Brannon P. Denning, Judge
Noonan’s J’Accuse . . . !, 34 CUMB. L. REV. 477 (2003−2004) (book review); Ernest A.
Young, Is the Sky Falling on the Federal Government? State Sovereign Immunity, the
Section Five Power, and the Federal Balance, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1551 (2003) (book review).
For a more favorable review, see Carl Tobias, Unmasking Federalism, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
1833 (2003) (book review).
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The near-hysteria expressed by some academics at the Court’s tentative
steps toward judicial enforcement of federalism principles obscured a good deal
that should have given comfort to those who heard, in the opinions of the
Federalism Five, the hoofbeats of the New Deal’s famously obstructionist
“Four Horsemen.” First, there were a number of cases decided
contemporaneously with those whose holdings were in tension with the
federalism cases, and the Court never seemed (as Raich graphically
demonstrates) to be able to follow earlier cases to their logical conclusions.
Second, when examined closely, many of the “restraints” imposed on Congress
by the Court’s federalism decisions proved to be rather mild fetters that could
easily be circumvented.
In this Part we attempt a retrospective (if panoramic) view of these
dissonant notes in the Rehnquist Court’s federalism project. Future historians
might consider whether there was, at last, anything for the Raich Court to kill
off—if, in fact, Raich represents any retreat at all.
A. The Spending Power

Many hoped that the Court would follow up Lopez by elaborating the
limits on Congress’s power to impose conditional restrictions on money
appropriated to states, thus enabling it to regulate indirectly what it could not
regulate directly.64 In Sabri v. United States,65 however, the Court declined the
opportunity, upholding Congress’s power to criminalize bribery of a state
official concerning a state program that received some federal money, despite
the lack of any connection between the federal money and the bribe itself.66
While there were some procedural issues that made the issues in Sabri less
clean than they might have been, nothing in the case indicated any appetite to
strengthen Dole’s rather flaccid constraints on conditional spending
requirements, much less revisit larger constitutional questions such as whether
Congress can spend “for the general welfare” or only in connection with one of
its Article I, Section 8 enumerated powers.
B. Preemption

Court critics made great sport of contrasting several of the Court’s recent
cases in which state power was deemed to have been preempted by federal law
with cases like Morrison or Seminole Tribe. Indeed, the Court—including
members of the Federalism Five—has shown a real appetite for applying
implied preemption doctrines liberally, even to the point of limiting or
64
See generally Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1911 (1995).
65
541 U.S. 600 (2004).
66
For a critical commentary on the decision, see Gary Lawson, Making a Federal Case
Out of It: Sabri v. United States and the Constitution of Leviathan, 2003−2004 CATO SUP.
CT. REV. 119; see also Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, the Spending Power, and
Federal Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2003) (urging the Court to reverse the lower
court decision upholding Sabri’s indictment).
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extinguishing state common law tort claims,67 despite the Court’s previous
admonition that preemption of statutes reflecting an exercise of a state’s
traditional police powers required a clear statement of congressional intent to
do so.68 The erosion of the “presumption against preemption” has been
particularly noticeable in cases involving state regulations that have
international implications. Recently, in fact, the Court held that a mere
presidential policy statement that Holocaust survivors and their heirs should
settle claims outside of the judicial system and through a system established by
executive agreement was sufficient to preempt a state law requiring merely that
insurance companies disclose their involvement in insurance sales prior to the
Holocaust as a condition of doing business in the state.69 This despite the fact
that the executive agreement establishing the compensation fund disclaimed
any preemptive intent and the fact that Congress had both acknowledged that
states were legislating in this area and had, years before, left the regulation of
the insurance industry to the states.
C. The Anti-Commandeering Principle

In the wake of New York v. United States and Printz, there were questions
about the extent to which the so-called “anti-commandeering principle”
operated. After all, preemption itself, as Mark Tushnet has argued, constitutes a
type of commandeering, since it “commands” the states and their officials not
to engage in particular types of conduct, and may require the expenditure of
resources to comply with the federal regime.70 South Carolina might therefore
have been forgiven for thinking that it had a winner when it challenged a
federal statute prohibiting any person or state from selling driver’s license
data.71 The Court thought otherwise. In a unanimous opinion, it drew a
distinction between mandates from the federal government that required
affirmative action on the part of states and their officials and preemption,
which, it noted, not only required mere forbearance on the state’s part but was

67

See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (noting that if Congress
legislates in an area traditionally regulated by states, “we start with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress”).
69
Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (striking down California statute
requiring disclosure of sale of insurance policies in Europe immediately before and during
the Second World War); see also Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363
(2000) (striking down Massachusetts law prohibiting companies doing business with Burma
to compete for state contracts); United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000) (striking down
state regulations of international oil tankers entering state harbor; held, federal law
preempted state measures). For criticism of Garamendi, see Brannon P. Denning & Michael
D. Ramsey, American Insurance Association v. Garamendi and Executive Preemption in
Foreign Affairs, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825 (2004).
70
See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 83−90 (2003).
71
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721−25 (2000 & Supp.
2005).
68
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also rooted in the text of the Supremacy Clause itself.72 Since the Act in
question was a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power, the Court held it
was binding on the states.
D. The Commerce Power

Soon after Lopez was decided, the Court decided United States v.
Robertson, which raised the question whether a local Alaska gold mine’s
operations “substantially affected” interstate commerce for purposes of the
RICO statute.73 In a per curiam opinion, the Court concluded that because the
mine purchased out-of-state equipment and supplies, it was engaged in
interstate commerce for purposes of that statute, and did not reach the
substantial effects question.74 For some commentators Robertson signaled that
Lopez was likely a limited decision.75 Had Lopez been a truly transformative
opinion, one might have expected the Court to hear more Commerce Clause
cases, much as it did when expanding the scope of sovereign immunity. The
Court did not lack for attractive candidates, but it either refused to grant
certiorari,76 dodged the constitutional question,77 or affirmed the power of
72
Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000) (writing that “the DPPA does not require
the States in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens. The DPPA regulates the
States as the owners of data bases. It does not require the South Carolina Legislature to enact
any laws or regulations, and it does not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of
federal statutes regulating private individuals. We accordingly conclude that the DPPA is
consistent with the constitutional principles enunciated in New York and Printz”).
73
514 U.S. 669 (1995) (per curiam).
74
Id. at 671.
75
See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, Crime Control and the Commerce Clause: Life after
Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 801, 833 (1996) (suggesting that when considered with
Lopez concurring opinions, Robertson “portends more stability in Commerce Clause
jurisprudence than some Court watchers initially predicted”) (footnote omitted); Richard A.
Epstein, Constitutional Faith and the Commerce Clause, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 176
& n.48 (1996) (asking whether “we are about to enter an age in which there are extensive
limits on the ability of the federal government to enact criminal law statutes” and answering
“Perhaps not” in light of Robertson); Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United
States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 206 n.227 (doubting whether Lopez “will have any
significant effect” in light of Robertson); Stephen R. McAllister, Is There a Judicially
Enforceable Limit to Congressional Power Under the Commerce Clause? 44 U. KAN. L.
REV. 217, 219 n.20 (1996) (noting that, in light of Robertson, “pronouncements that Lopez
signals a radical departure from precedent and a new era in Commerce Clause jurisprudence
are at this time unwarranted and vastly overblown”); Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce! 94
MICH. L. REV. 674, 733 (1995) (arguing that “Robertson, in sum, confirms that the Court
does not intend an imminent, draconian reversal of its Commerce Clause jurisprudence with
Lopez”).
76
See, e.g., Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000) (upholding authority of Fish
and Wildlife Service to promulgate regulation prohibiting killing, on private land, of red
wolves reintroduced into North Carolina), cert. denied sub nom. Gibbs v. Norton, 531 U.S.
1145 (2001); United States v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2000) (upholding congressional
power to pass the Federal Access to Clinic Entrances Act), cert. denied 532 U.S. 971 (2001).
77
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Co. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531
U.S. 159, 174 (2001) (concluding that Congress had not given clear statement of intent to
permit Corps to define “navigable waters” broadly to include all waters that are or might be
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Congress.78 With the benefit of hindsight, it is Lopez and Morrison, not Raich,
that look like the outliers.79
E. The Scope of Congressional Power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment

Another of Rehnquist Court critics’ bete noires80 was the limitation
imposed by the Court on congressional power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment. Announced unanimously in Boerne v. Flores, that Court’s
“proportionality and congruence” test combined with the Court’s robust
sovereign immunity jurisprudence to curb congressional efforts to subject states
to liability for damages under federal civil rights statutes.81 In 2003, however,
the Court pulled back, voting 6-3 to uphold provisions of the Family and
Medical Leave Act.82 Professor Suzanna Sherry has persuasively argued that
Hibbs is not consistent with what the Court’s prior cases in this area hold, and
that the Court “unmade” precedent in order to reach the result it desired.83
***

used by certain types of birds); see generally Michael J. Gerhardt, On Revolution and
Wetland Regulation, 90 GEO. L.J. 2143 (2002). Cf. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood,
541 U.S. 440 (2004) (avoiding the question whether congressional power under the
bankruptcy clause could abrogate state sovereign immunity). For an argument that it should
not, see Adam Feibelman, Federal Bankruptcy Law and State Sovereign Immunity, 81 TEX.
L. REV. 1381 (2003).
78
Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52 (2003) (per curiam) (rejecting narrow
state court interpretation of Federal Arbitration Act); Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129
(2003) (reversing state court invalidation of federal statute barring certain traffic safety data
from being discovered in state or federal court trials); United States v. Robertson, 514 U.S.
669 (1995) (per curiam); Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995)
(rejecting attempt to limit scope of Federal Arbitration Act). For arguments that the
unanimity in some of these cases masked important (and difficult) questions, see Lynn A.
Baker, Federalism and Spending Power from Dole to Birmingham Board of Education, in
THE REHNQUIST LEGACY (Craig Bradley ed., forthcoming 2006) (abstract available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id734564); Mitchell N. Berman, Guillen
and Gullibility: Piercing the Surface of Commerce Clause Doctrine, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1487
(2003).
79
See also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (rejecting arguments that Court
should restrict congressional power to retroactively extend copyright terms); see
generally Richard A. Posner, The Constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act:
Economics, Politics, Law, and Judicial Technique in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 2003 SUP. CT. REV.
143, 143 n.3 (speculating that the liberal justices on the Court voted to grant cert in the case
“hoping that a decision to uphold the constitutionality of the Sonny Bono Act would
undermine the conservative Justices’ jurisprudence of judicially enforced limits on
Congress’s enumerated powers, such as the power to regulate commerce”); id. at 152−56
(describing the tension between Eldred and cases like Lopez).
80
See, e.g., NOONAN, supra note 63.
81
For a wonderful succinct summary of the doctrine, see Suzanna Sherry, The
Unmaking of a Precedent, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 231, 233−36.
82
Nevada Dep’t Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
83
Sherry, supra note 81.
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When one focuses on the sweep of the Court’s cases (especially within the
last five years), as opposed to focusing on particular decisions, Judge Noonan’s
claim that the Court had “sided with the states” seems melodramatic. In fact, it
seems as if the Court’s moves towards federalism were merely dissonant notes
in an overwhelmingly nationalist melody.84 That was the thesis of Robert
Nagel’s The Implosion of American Federalism, a book that, when it was
written, was decidedly heterodox.85
Nagel argued that whatever moves the Court was making in the name of
“federalism” or “state’s rights” were overshadowed—particularly in its
decisions under the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment—by a
consistent and relentless nationalization that began sixty years ago and
continued largely unabated, even during the high tide of the Rehnquist Court’s
federalism project. He concluded that even ostensibly “state’s rights” or
“federalist” justices actually offered a relatively tepid federalism, that “radical
federalism” was unlikely, and that the Court’s program of “radical
nationalism,” particularly in civil liberties areas was likely to continue
unabated. What seemed to be a somewhat peevish dissent from the
conventional wisdom at the time, after Raich, looks prescient.
Looking at the case law as a whole, we wonder whether there was enough
life left in judicially-enforceable federalism for Raich to kill. In retrospect, it
seems the Rehnquist Court conjured a zombie federalism that wandered
aimlessly for a while, killing off the occasional federal statute drafted with no
thought as to constitutionality (akin to the usual horror movie zombie victims
who wander away from the group), but which, in the end, was pretty easy to
kill without even the aid of a shotgun-wielding action hero.
VII. CONCLUSION

The jury was out on whether Lopez and Morrison marked the repudiation
of the near-toothless “process federalism” of Garcia. But now the jury has
returned, and its verdict appears unfavorable. Barring a major, and unlikely,
shift of the Court’s composition, we now doubt that a robust judiciallyenforceable federalism has much future left. We are unlikely to see a lower
federal court, after Raich, strike down an act of Congress on Commerce Clause
grounds, or even take the more modest step of upholding an as-applied
challenge to a federal law. More troubling is that lower court judges may be
even slower, after Raich, to implement Supreme Court decisions that the Court
is firmly behind. Federal judges, like Judge Kozinski, faithfully and
conscientiously applied the Court’s Lopez and Morrison instructions only to
have the Court pull the rug out from under them, vacating their decisions
following Raich.86 Chief Justice John Roberts criticized his colleagues on the
D.C. Circuit for not squarely facing the questions raised about the Endangered
84
See also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (striking down
Arkansas’ attempts to limit terms of congressional delegation).
85
ROBERT F. NAGEL, THE IMPLOSION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2001).
86
See supra note 21.
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Species Act by Lopez and Morrison,87 and found himself portrayed as an
“extremist” during his confirmation hearings.88 This unpredictability cannot be
good for the Court as an institution, and will not do much to inspire confidence
in it among lower courts.
Finally, and most distressing, is the possibility that Raich announces a
return to the days in which the Bill of Rights is the only judicially-enforced
limit on the power of the federal government. The Court’s nascent attempt, preRaich, to find some limit to the legislative power of Congress might have been
confusing, it might have been messy, reasonable people could differ on where
to draw the line, but it was at least an attempt to give substance to Chief Justice
Marshall’s truism that enumerated powers presume something not enumerated.
It is also worth remembering that lines of doctrine in the area of civil liberties
(think state action or the Establishment Clause) are not without their problems
either, yet no one has seriously suggested that the Court simply leave it to
Congress or to the states to ascertain the scope of their own power vis-a-vis
these provisions.
Perhaps we are too pessimistic. Raich did not overrule Lopez and
Morrison. The anti-commandeering principle remains. And Raich could renew
an important conversation over the scope and meaning of the Necessary and
Proper Clause and its relationship with the other powers of Congress. It is also
possible that in a case presenting a less politically charged topic than medical
marijuana, the Court will return to its project of policing at least an outer limit
to the powers of Congress.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court’s action in Raich (and in the other
instances of backpedaling we mention) will make it much harder for a future
Court to exercise influence over the lower courts, except to the extent that it is
steering them in directions that they already desire to go. And that may offer a
lesson as well. Chief Justice Rehnquist was as strong, and as ideologically
settled, as any Chief Justice in recent memory. Nonetheless, his ability to move
the Supreme Court—or the courts as a whole—in the direction of his agenda
was extremely limited. Administrative agencies have been famously

87

Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
88
See, e.g., Julie Hilden, Supreme Court Nominee John Roberts’s Controversial
Environmental Law Dissent: It Reveals Him as an Extreme Proponent of “States’ Rights”
Federalism, to the Detriment of Endangered Species, FINDLAW’S WRIT, Aug. 1, 2005,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hilden/20050801.html.
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condemned as a “headless ‘fourth branch’” of government.89 It is beginning to
seem as if the third branch is more or less headless as well.

89

THE PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
STUDIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (1937).
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